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In the history of Anglo-European political thought it was 
commonly believed that the basic precepts of human practical 
rationality were to be found in the natural law doctrine. Enduring 
in human nature, these precepts were said to be knowable by all 
human beings. In addition, due to their power to direct these 
beings towards intrinsic goods, these principles were considered to 
be equally binding on all such beings. Taking this history into 
account one could, today, surmise that a viable grounding of 
universal human rights should implement the ground already coof 
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human practical rationality were to be found in the natural law 
doctrine. Enduring in human nature, these precepts were said to be 
knowable by all human beings. In addition, due to their power to 
direct these beings towards intrinsic goods, these principles were 
considered to be equally binding on all such beings. Taking this 
history into account one could, today, surmise that a viable 
grounding of universal human rights should implement the ground 
already covered by the natural law doctrine.  
In the intercultural/cross-cultural context, however, some 
authors are more cautious and hesitate to apply this model to non-
Anglo European contexts on two counts (see Panikkar 1982): The 
natural law doctrine, firstly, arose in a specific European context 
and was profoundly shaped by contemporary philosophical 
assumptions and concerns. Were this doctrine to be applied 
globally, it would unfairly privilege the context in which it arose, 
and thus be skewed. Yet, if this model, despite its historicity, were, 
secondly, to be applied to non-Anglo European contexts, it would 
mistakenly lead one to believe that indigenous resources are not 
conducive to the development of any concept similar to universal 
rights. In consequence, these rights are, and continue to be, unique 
achievements of the Anglo-European context. 
One reason driving this critique is the view that the 
universality of human rights cannot be achieved by declaring them 
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to be self-evident truths which are to be established by unilateral 
fiat. Human rights cannot be reasonably considered to be 
postulates which are beyond debate. In fact, to be truly universal, 
these rights must be grounded and justified to the human beings 
who are subjected to them. They “gain their normative force by 
being reflexively tested, interpreted and negotiated en passant” 
(Tully 2012: 4).  
My paper can be squarely located within this framework. 
Human beings, I believe, cannot be subjected to any institutional 
norms which are not justified to them. In the human rights context, 
for example, justifications cannot exclude the human beings 
affected by them. As Rainer Forst writes in a general vein: 
“[W]hen it comes to grounding fundamental human rights, the 
starting point is a basic claim to be respected as a ‘normative 
agent’ who can give and who deserves justifying reasons” (2010: 
724). 
The paper’s focus is specific: it examines the conception of 
natural law and rights of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (1869-
1948), and endeavors to develop a reasonable, immanent account 
of it. Why, one would ask, should Gandhi’s understanding of 
natural law merit scholarly attention at all? At least two different 
reasons come to mind. A first reason can be drawn from 
comparative philosophy. Given the interdependence of our 
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pluralistic societies, scholars cannot, without further reason, 
continue to use the resources of a single and dominant tradition to 
capture, inquire into, analyze, and explain political life in the 
global context. “[O]ne segment of the world’s population cannot 
monopolize the language or the idiom of the emerging ‘village,’ or 
global civil society. Shared meanings and practices—to the extent 
that they are possible—can only arise from lateral interaction, 
negotiation, and contestation among different, historically grown, 
cultural frameworks” (Dallmayr 2004: 249).133 A sustained 
reflection upon the status and meaning of political life in the global 
arena is called for, such that it sifts through and isolates ideas, 
thinkers, and positions located in different, local, contexts. To do 
otherwise, would be a sign of “intellectual inhospitableness” (ibid.: 
250).  
A second reason stems from a core concern of public 
philosophy. One crucial task of philosophers engaged in this field 
would be to critically engage with phenomena in the public sphere 
in order to develop models which, in their own ways, can abet 
societal debates because they are, for example, closer to the 
                                                
133 Cf. Bilgrami (2002: 83).  
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interpretations on the ground.134 Given that the post-independent 
Indian polity makes use of individual rights to achieve its goals of 
justice, liberty and equality for all its citizens,135 it is easy to 
isolate a grounding of rights as one important area of concern. 
Philosophers working in this area should engage with, inquire into, 
reconstruct, and critique all those (contrasting) narratives which in 
their own ways deal with these rights. The general idea underlying 
                                                
134 Tully writes: “Public philosophy as a critical activity starts from the 
practices and problems of political life, but it begins by questioning whether the 
inherited languages of description and reflection are adequate to the task” (Tully 
2008: 19).   
My reconstruction of Gandhi’s understanding of natural law is an attempt at 
resurrecting an understanding developed in the Indian context. I will not pit it 
against any ‘standard’ way of interpreting natural law in political philosophy. 
Rather, I will attempt to articulate an understanding of rights found in this 
specific context. Keeping with Tully’s pragmatic understanding of political 
philosophy, I will, thus, critically survey one specific solution proffered to 
address the problem of social justice in India (cf. ibid.: 26). This, however, does 
not rule out the possibility that the Gandhian conception could become relevant 
in other cultural contexts as well.   
135 The Preamble of the Indian constitution asserts that it will attempt to secure 
social, economic and political justice of all citizens; liberty of thought, 
expression, belief and worship; and equality of status and opportunity (See 
http://www.constitution.org/cons/india/preamble.html; last accessed on 9 May 
2014). 
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this exercise would be that these narratives work into, inform, and 
influence citizens’ background assumptions on how they 
understand and interpret the “conceptual cluster” related to 
rights.136 In today’s post-independent Indian society, one could 
doubt whether Gandhi’s rendition of natural law and rights plays 
any active role at all. Yet, it would be difficult to categorically 
deny that it does exist as a narrative in this society. As Ananya 
Vajpeyi puts it: “Today, in the early part of the twenty-first 
century, we live as much in Gandhi’s India as we do in the India of 
Nehru, Tagore or Ambedkar, in certain ways; in other ways, India 
has pursued directions, that none of these men would have pursued 
or endorsed” (Vajpeyi 2012: 201). 
                                                
136 Henry Rosemont, Jr. has coined this useful phrase to denote how a battery 
of concepts comes into play in processes of cross-cultural comparison 
(Rosemont 1988: 60-66). When a scholar situated in a Anglo-European 
philosophical tradition attempts to ascertain the presence or absence of the 
human rights concept in a non-Anglo European tradition, for example, he or she 
also draws on related concepts clustered around the former, like liberty, the 
individual, property, autonomy, freedom, reason, and choice (Rosemont 2004: 
54). This aspect leads Rosemont to believe that comparative philosophers 
engaged in cross-cultural work must help articulate alternative conceptual-
clusters. 
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Before we examine this aspect of Gandhian thought, let us 
briefly sketch the paradigmatic view of the natural law doctrine 
and its relation to natural and human rights in the remaining part of 
this introductory section.137 According to the paradigmatic view, 
all human beings participate in the plan of creation by acting 
according to natural law; its precepts are universally binding by 
nature. If it can be ascertained that a being shares our human 
nature and therefore can be rightly said to be a human being, for 
example, it is bound by these precepts and is expected to act 
accordingly. These precepts, likewise, are universally knowable by 
using one’s mental faculties, the foremost being human reason.138 
With the help of these precepts, natural law is said to direct us 
towards certain goods and it, moreover, defines the main 
parameters of right action. Its precepts, furthermore, can be 
captured and formulated in the form of general rules. Natural law 
                                                
137 For a lucid introductory account see Boucher (2009). 
138 John Locke instantiates this view when he states: “The state of nature has a 
law of nature to govern it, which obliges every one: and reason, which is that 
law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and 
independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or 
possessions: for men being all the workmanship of one omnipotent and 
infinitely wise Maker; all the servants of one sovereign master, sent into the 
world by his order, and about his business [...]” (Locke 1824: 133).   
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itself is, thus, immutable, self-evident, and absolute; its principles 
can, however, be adapted to individual situations.  
In the history of political thought, natural rights were 
gleaned from the natural law doctrine; in the course of time these 
rights were further developed into human rights. Explaining the 
shift from the “natural” to the “human,” David Boucher states: “It 
reflects an unease about whether nature, or any derivative term for 
the world as it is, is capable of generating any normative 
principles. The term ‘human rights’ shifts the focus from the 
source of the rights on to those who possess them. The basis of 
such rights is left uncomfortably vague” (Boucher 2009: 245). 
Nevertheless, the notion of inalienable rights “form[s] part of the 
current landscape of moral, political, and legal discourse” (ibid.: 
247). Human beings, moreover, are said to possess an ability to 
recognize these rights and act accordingly, such that, at least in 
theory, all of them are driven by an equal consideration of the 
other. Thus, a human right in this view is a general, categorical, 
moral entitlement of all human beings. As the term “human right” 
implies, its scope cannot be restricted within the human 
community by, for example, taking into account status, gender, 
membership in a particular nation or other contingent and 
ascriptive factors. Such a right has to encompass all human beings 
in a given time-frame. 
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Let us now turn to Gandhi’s understanding of natural law 
and rights. For this purpose, section two will attempt to reconstruct 
the main features of Gandhi’s social utopia (Section II). Section 
three will attend to his understanding of natural law and rights 
(Section III). In examining the relevance of such reconstructions in 
the final section, I will return to the justificatory aspect mentioned 
in this introduction (Section IV). 
II Gandhi’s Social Utopia  
Gandhi’s ideal society is a self-sufficient unit which can cater to 
all the needs of its members. Furthermore, its members share 
commonly held moral values. They believe that moral progress 
can only be achieved by curbing material development, which 
leads to greed and avarice. Commodities essential for daily life are 
produced through the labor of all capable members. Importantly, 
only as much as is needed to satisfy members’ daily needs is 
produced; any kind of surplus is avoided. Needless to say, such a 
society does not seek to maximize its profits. 
How can such an ideal society become self-sufficient? 
Gandhi, firstly, would ask one to differentiate between basic needs 
and other non-essential inclinations, which on first impression 
appear to be elementary, and vital. A closer scrutiny, however, 
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would reveal that the latter are not necessary in leading a human 
life and should, therefore, be given up. Given that goods cannot be 
replenished over an extended period of time, he is, additionally, of 
the opinion that the fulfillment of basic needs must be minimized 
too. Nature only produces as much as is needed by all living 
beings for their daily sustenance:  
“It is theft to take something from another 
even with his permission if we have no real 
need of it. We are not always aware of our 
real needs, and most of us improperly 
multiply our wants and thus unconsciously 
make thieves of our selves. If we devote 
some thought to the subject we shall find 
that we can get rid of quite a number of 
wants” (Gandhi 1987: 471; see also ibid.: 
473).  
Teasing out some implications of this model, it could be argued 
that such an ideally self-sufficient society, firstly, does not 
necessarily depend on money to regulate its exchange of goods. 
Theoretically, any other viable means of exchange could be 
implemented too. Secondly, individual tasks cannot be ranked 
according to their order of importance since every chore is 
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essential to the sustainment and flourishing of the society as a 
whole. This would, in turn, mean that every task has to be 
remunerated equally, regardless of the amount of energy required 
in carrying it out, the time needed to learn it, or the qualifications 
acquired for it. With an equal remuneration, societal members will 
not compete with each other for social goods. Thirdly, an 
improvement in productivity does not necessarily prove to be 
advantageous. It could lead to an overabundance of, say, consumer 
goods. It is more important, fourthly, that a society ensures that 
every member has access to labor; only then can it claim that it is 
well-ordered:  
“In well-ordered society, the securing of 
one’s livelihood should be and is found to 
be the easiest thing in the world. Indeed, 
the test of orderliness in a country is not 
the number of millionaires it owns, but the 
absence of starvation amongst its masses” 
(Gandhi 1986: 357).  
Gandhi was well aware of how utopian his blueprint of an ideal 
society was. To take up some of his arguments: The onset of 
modernization in India made clear that the abilities needed were 
task-specific, which in turn meant that a uniform remuneration was 
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not possible. Furthermore, economic disparities between social 
classes were a consequence of colonization. The British land 
policy had led to the rise of a class of parasitical landlords who had 
a detrimental effect on villages, which had been economically self-
sufficient until then. Moreover, Gandhi thought that the problem of 
corruption could not be tackled by idealistically wanting to do 
away with money altogether. Rather, one would have to come to 
terms with the monopoly of money. As he observed, many people 
are not completely able to abandon their pecuniary ambition (ibid.: 
359). Furthermore, the relativity of wealth and poverty did not 
escape him. At any given period of time, members of a single 
society can be thought of as being wealthy or poor only in relation 
to each other. Without such an internal standard of comparison, it 
would, therefore, be meaningless to believe that they should be 
made equally rich or poor (ibid.: 339; Gandhi 1987: 420).  
However, this did not lead Gandhi to simply resign and 
completely accept human frailties. He actively tried to reconcile 
his social model with what he took people to be. For example, the 
rich were not expected to completely relinquish their wealth. They 
were called upon to earn their money truthfully and use it for the 
common weal (ibid.: 441). Given that the labor of the lesser 
privileged (or underprivileged) was crucial in the creation, 
retention, and in the increase of capital, the privileged had to 
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regard themselves as their trustees. If the latter were to engage in 
daily physical work, they would be in a better position to 
appreciate that certain basic amenities could only be procured by 
physical effort. Moreover, Gandhi optimistically held that only 
physical exertion would make the rich aware that their avarice 
could but be pursued at the cost of others. Such an experience, he 
thought, would make them reduce the amount they needed for their 
daily sustenance. In the long run, therefore, such an enriching 
experience would lead to a reduction of economic inequality, 
because the rich would voluntarily reduce their consumption of 
goods.139 
Gandhi’s attempt at reconciling his utopian vision with 
given social conditions, however, leads to many questions: How 
does one determine, for example, and differentiate between basic, 
                                                
139 As Bilgrami (2002: 86) rightly points out, Gandhi stresses the role of 
exemplars as against moral principles: “One is fully confident in the choices one 
wants to set up as exemplars, and in the moral values they exemplify. On the 
other hand, because no principle is generated, the conviction and confidence in 
one’s opinion does not arrogate, it puts us in no position to be critical of others 
because there is no generality in their truth, of which others may fall afoul. 
Others may not follow. Our example may not set. But that is not the same as 
disobeying an imperative, violating a principle.” 
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fundamental needs and secondary inclinations?140 Should a 
society specify what the basic needs of its members at a given time 
should be? Or are basic needs an immutable, essential feature of 
humanity? This open-ended postulation of basic needs leads to a 
further difficulty: Gandhi’s social utopia is perfectionist; a good 
life is determined with the help of specific values (with modesty 
and honesty being good candidates in this regard141). In 
countering this objection on his behalf, one could argue that his 
social utopia is, first and foremost, a critique of the status quo. 
Beginning with a critical review of social problems, he proceeds to 
chalk out the contours of a good life. Yet even if this were to be 
conceded, Gandhi’s perfectionism gets him into (at least one) 
serious difficulty; it leads one to believe that certain life-forms are 
not desirable. Let me explain. 
                                                
140 In this regard, Amartya Sen’s capability approach could prove to be 
valuable in differentiating between basic needs, desires, wants and secondary 
inclinations. Is a person actually able to do the thing she would value doing? 
This question, which seems to set the frame for Sen’s capability approach, 
would be salient to the Gandhian conception too. Sen explores the relationship 
between capabilities, justice and rights in, for example, (Sen 2005b, 2010).   
141 Bilgrami’s (2002: 90-91) argument that truth is a moral value for Gandhi 
seems to tally with the interpretation offered here. 
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A member of Gandhi’s utopia cannot automatically claim a 
reward for the work one has done. In all probability, this society 
will tend to favor only those tasks which are of immediate use to 
it; other activities will most likely be sidelined. This would entail 
that certain ways of human flourishing are privileged within this 
society; the complete gamut of human flourishing will, as a result, 
be reduced in its scope. But if members at a particular stage are 
unable to ascertain the utility of certain activities should they, then, 
be given time to prove their utility (cf. Gandhi 1987: 546)? If so, 
how does one determine the time span needed for doing so? 
I presume that Gandhi would not have been particularly 
moved by these questions and doubts. He invoked his 
understanding of the Hindu tradition to stress the role of duties in a 
life well-led. Every human being, he believed, is born with duties 
which one has to fulfill according to one’s station in life. These 
could be discharged most effectively by adopting an attitude of 
detachment and renunciation. Actions would then be carried out 
without taking into consideration the positive consequences which 
would ensue. This attitude would be meaningful for both the 
collective and the individual themselves—social duties would be 
performed well and the individual would be able to reduce the 
duties which one was born with during the course of one’s 
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lifetime. In fact, Gandhi takes this spirit of renunciation as a 
distinctive feature of being human:  
“For human beings renunciation itself is 
enjoyment. This is what differentiates man 
from the beast” (Gandhi 1987: 465).  
Accordingly, he firmly believed that a society should not seek to 
increase the standard of living of its members, but rather try to 
establish conditions which would enable them to fulfill their duties 
properly.142 Every human being should make her resources 
available to all living beings, human and otherwise. If this is 
indeed the case, does this understanding have any use for rights at 
all?  
Although Gandhi’s understanding of rights will be fully 
developed in the following section, it suffices at this point to 
underscore the derivative nature of rights found in this conception. 
Rights result from actions well done. They are earned when social 
activities are successfully completed and cannot be meaningfully 
understood as claims to fight for. In his famous letter to the 
UNESCO in 1947 he stated in no uncertain terms:  
                                                
142 “We can only strive to increase man’s opportunities of realizing and 
fulfilling his duties and of getting nearer to God” (Gandhi 1987: 502). 
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“I learnt from my illiterate but wise mother that all rights to 
be deserved and preserved came from duty well done. Thus 
the very right to live accrues to us only when we do the duty 
of citizenship of the world. From this one fundamental 
statement, perhaps it is easy enough to define the duties of 
Man and Woman and correlate every right to some 
corresponding duty to be first performed. Every other right 
can be shown to be a usurpation hardly worth fighting for” 
(Gandhi 1950: 18).  
Prudential considerations, thus, seem to play a crucial role in this 
understanding of rights. Duties lead to a stable social order and can 
equally ensure that every person obtains that to which she is 
entitled to (see below). But how does Gandhi ensure a just 
distribution?143 To answer this question meaningfully, let us draw 
on his understanding of natural law and rights.  
                                                
143 Writing on the eve of Indian Independence on 6th. July 1947, he said (1987: 
496): “If all simply insist on rights and no duties, there will be utter confusion 
and chaos.  
If instead of insisting on rights everyone does his duty, there will immediately 
be the rule of order established among mankind. There is no such thing as the 
divine right of kings to rule and the humble duty of the ryots [peasants] to pay 
respectful obedience to their masters.” 
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III Gandhi’s Conception of Natural Law and Rights 
Gandhi’s Natural Law  
The starting point of the Gandhian conception of rights is a 
transcendental natural law which seems to bestow an inalienable, 
natural right on every living being; in regulating human relations it 
can be invoked as a just measure.144 Its mode of operation is 
harmony and order, which are thought of as reflecting the natural 
way of things. With the power of one’s conscience, a human being 
can gain an insight into this law and can adapt his or her behavior 
accordingly. Furthermore, one’s conscience allows one  to easily 
comprehend that nature produces only as much as needed by her 
creatures:  
“Nature provides for the needs of every 
living creature from moment to moment, 
and I also see that, voluntarily or 
involuntarily, knowingly or unknowingly, 
we violate this great law every moment of 
                                                
144 Bilgrami attributes Gandhi’s view that the human body is quite continuous 
with a “spiritually suffused natural environment” to the pervasive influence of 
Vaisnavite and Bhakti ideals on him (Bilgrami 2009: 49; cf. Bilgrami 2012: 10). 
The influence of Advaitic metaphysics will be sketched below. 
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our lives. All of us can see that, in 
consequence of doing so, on the one hand 
large numbers suffer through over-
indulgence and, on the other, countless 
people suffer through want” (Gandhi 1987: 
439).  
Gandhi’s Natural Rights 
In a further step, the transcendental natural law is used to 
legitimize certain rights. These rights are natural rights insofar as 
they are bestowed by nature. A basic right in this regard is the 
right to life. If every creature is entitled to a share of natural 
resources, it is evident that it has a natural right to its life and to 
secure its livelihood.145 From a human perspective, it follows that 
it is unjustifiable to accumulate possessions and property since this 
would imply taking away that which rightfully belongs to another. 
Gandhi repeatedly stresses that one should only stake a claim and 
                                                
145 “Every human being has a right to live and therefore find the wherewithal 
to feed himself and where necessary to clothe and house himself” (Gandhi 1986: 
256).  
If every creature has a natural right to life, it can be argued that human beings 
cannot reasonably place themselves above other creatures. This trail cannot be 
followed within the scope of this paper. 
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consume that which is needed for one’s daily survival, while 
ensuring that others get their due. These thoughts, incidentally, 
encapsulate Gandhi’s concept of sarvodaya: the greatest good of 
the greatest number. This good would ensue when members are 
ready to give up their own short-term interests for the good of all. 
In addition to this right to life, human beings are said to possess an 
unhindered freedom to obtain and enjoy vital resources, and the 
freedom to develop their personality. More importantly, however, 
these rights are incumbent upon particular cooperatives for their 
implementation.  
Now, one could argue that these rights, understood in this 
context as liberties, somehow support the process of individuation. 
With their help, human beings can elicit ways of leading a life as 
they see fit. In a crucial way, however, many such rights (like the 
right to life, the right to bodily integrity etc.) depend upon the 
acquisition of property. Why does this conception choose to 
oversee this aspect? Why is the acquisition of property 
conspicuous by its absence in Gandhi’s conception?   
Several reasons seem to plausibly explain this skepticism. 
Let us firstly begin with the understanding of freedom at play here. 
Gandhi takes pains to severe the link between freedom and any 
(individual or communal) acquisition of material goods. Being 
free, means having the opportunity to surrender everything one 
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possesses, including one’s own body. Real freedom cannot be 
understood as an enjoyment of property because the latter entails 
taking something from another. 
“[T]he only thing that can be possessed by 
all is non-possession not to have anything 
whatsoever. In other words, a willing 
surrender” (Gandhi 1971b: 52). 
Secondly, his justification of equality is equally important. In this 
regard, Gandhi, like many other Indian thinkers of this period, 
drew upon Advaita metaphysics to justify the inherent natural 
equality of all human beings:  
“I believe implicitly that all men are born 
equal. All […] have the same soul as any 
other. And it is because I believe in this 
inherent equality of all men that I fight the 
doctrine of superiority which many of our 
rulers arrogate to themselves […] He who 
claims superiority at once forfeits his claim 
to be called a man.” (Gandhi 1987: 499) 
All human beings were said to be part of the same universal atman 
which, in turn, strove for its union with brahman. This union, 
furthermore, was considered to be the utmost goal of every human 
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being. This goal could only be achieved through moral progress, 
which in turn could be impeded by an accumulation of goods. 
Gandhi, however, did not try to universalize his justification of 
human equality. He emphasized the search for truth and denied 
that any particular metaphysical position could serve as a universal 
justification (cf. Bilgrami 2002). 
Thirdly, Gandhi is sensitive to the exploitative nature of 
goods acquisition. In one’s r acquisition of material goods, every 
person tries to stake a claim to a maximum amount of resources at 
the cost of one’s fellow members. This process is conflict-laden 
and highly exploitive of the other given that nature only provides 
for a limited amount of resources. A globally just distribution of 
these resources is, therefore, bound to be costly and time-
consuming, to say the least. It would be more effective if 
everybody, especially the rich, voluntarily renounced the 
advantage they have accrued over the years. They should regard 
themselves as trustees of the common weal and ensure that every 
living being gets its rightful access to essential resources. 
Fourthly, Gandhi was deeply concerned about the moral 
progress of a human being. The main motor of this progress is 
Swaraj. In this understanding of Swaraj, self-rule/self-discipline 
and individuality are closely intertwined. The notion of self-
rule/self-discipline implies a voluntary internalization of our 
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obligation to others such that one is acutely aware of the larger 
social dimension of one’s actions, without giving in to selfish 
desires. Since we can hardly ever completely isolate ourselves 
from others, we cannot abdicate our moral obligations to them too. 
Furthermore, the freedom which results from self-rule/self-
discipline is a thoroughly individual process. It can only be 
claimed on the basis of self-awareness and presupposes self-effort. 
Thus, it cannot be bestowed upon one person or collective by 
another. For their part, collectivities cannot force this process 
either. Every individual has an “innate right” to err and even to 
sin.146 Every individual has a right to experiment until  he or she 
finds a way of life which is congruent with his or her stage of 
moral advancement.147 Admittedly, collectivities stand to profit 
                                                
146 “Freedom is not worth having if it does not connote freedom to err and even 
to sin. If God Almighty has given the humblest of His creatures the freedom to 
err, it passes my comprehension how human beings, be they ever so experienced 
and able, can delight in depriving other human beings of that precious right” 
(Gandhi 1971a: 253). 
147 “All progress is gained through mistakes and their rectification. No good 
comes fully fashioned […] but has to be carved out through repeated 
experiments and repeated failures by ourselves. This is the law of individual 
growth. The same law controls social and political evolution also. The right to 
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from the moral progress of their individual members. Nonetheless, 
the reasons mentioned above underline that they should restrict 
themselves to establishing conditions conducive to individual 
moral growth. If such reasons underscore Gandhi’s skepticism 
towards property, one would be inclined to hold that such a 
conception can forego with a state which cares for, and upholds, 
existent property relations. Would this view be tenable?  
 
Gandhi’s Natural Law and the State 
As the Gandhian interpretation of natural law explains, departures 
from natural law result in an onset of moral corruption. And yet, 
human beings can collectively find their way back to this eternal 
law and use it as a standard of orientation to guide their social 
relations. For this purpose, however, a state is unnecessary. As 
sketched above, members of Gandhi’s ideal society earnestly strive 
towards moral perfection and also support the moral progress of 
their fellow members. They abide by general moral norms because 
they are convinced of their truth and do not need an external, 
coercive authority like the state which pressurizes its members to 
follow certain norms. Members of a Gandhian society, thus, do not 
                                                                                                         
err, which means the freedom to try experiments, is the universal condition of 
all progress” (quoted from Iyer: 1973: 354). 
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need political institutions or political power to regulate their 
mutual relations. Their mutual life is regulated by an “enlightened 
anarchy” (Gandhi 1987: 602).  
Nevertheless, Gandhi did not completely deny the 
importance of a state in practice. A coercive, centralized state 
could encumber the moral development of an individual. This 
made him believe, “that the ideally non-violent State will be an 
ordered anarchy. That State will be the best governed which is 
governed the least” (Gandhi 1971b: 122). The state as an 
institution could best be a second option.148 More importantly, if 
the state did not carry out its tasks, the citizens could, Gandhi 
thought, legitimately try to alter it, or even abolish it.   
                                                
148 For a historical development of his theory of state, see Parekh (1989).  
As is well-known, Gandhi envisaged an independent India to consist of a 
republic of villages, without a centralized state: “In this structure composed of 
innumerable villages, there will be ever-widening, never-ascending circles. Life 
will not be a pyramid with the apex sustained by the bottom. But it will be an 
oceanic circle whose centre will be the individual always ready to perish for the 
village, the latter ready to perish for the circle of villages, till at last the whole 
becomes one life composed of individuals, never aggressive in their arrogance 
but ever humble, sharing the majesty of the oceanic circle of which they are 
integral units” (Gandhi 1989: 378). 
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In social practice, Gandhi was very well aware that a host 
of reasons could lead to a breakdown of cooperation. In such 
situations, members of a society should not tolerate the injustices 
meted out to them. In fact, they are asked to actively endeavor to 
secure a just distribution of the fruits of cooperation and resist 
unjustifiable disparities. Precisely these situations, however, 
demand that individuals possess certain powers which will enable 
them to attain justice. Writing on the problem of class in his Young 
India 26.3.1931, he states:  
“And since every right carries with it a 
corresponding duty and the corresponding 
remedy for resisting any attack upon it, it is 
merely a matter of finding out the 
corresponding duties and remedies to 
vindicate the elementary fundamental 
equality. The corresponding duty is to 
labour with my limbs and the 
corresponding remedy is to non-co-operate 
with him who deprives me of the fruit of 
my labour” (Gandhi 1987: 555). 
As noted above, individuals are entitled to certain rights which will 
enable them to claim their just share of restricted, natural 
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resources. There are, in this view, good prudential grounds for 
attaining these resources by doing one’s duties. These 
entitlements, nevertheless, do not lose their moral relevance. In 
fact, individuals and groups have a right to resist injustice. His 
famous draft (written with Nehru in 1930 for complete Indian 
independence) states: 
“We believe that it is the inalienable right 
of the Indian people, as of any other 
people, to have freedom and to enjoy the 
fruits of their toil and have the necessities 
of life, so that they may have full 
opportunities of growth. We believe also 
that if any government deprives a people of 
these rights and oppresses them, the people 
have a further right to alter it or to abolish 
it” (Gandhi 1970: 384). 
As is well known, Gandhi stressed that this right to resistance 
could only be sought for with the help of non-violent civil 
disobedience, which was an effective substitute for violence or 
armed rebellion. Both individuals and groups, he thought, should 
use the strategy of non-cooperation to increase the moral pressure 
on the wrongdoer. 
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We can, thus, see how Gandhi painstaking tries to correlate 
duties with rights. A person in this utopia does not lose sight of the 
social dimension of liberty, even in his or her exercise of a liberty 
conferred upon them. Rights are essential and beneficial to human 
beings as long as they are linked up with natural justice and not 
private interests. Further, they cannot be totally relinquished. 
Notably, individuals do not necessarily entrust the state with a just 
implementation of natural law in this conception of an ideal 
society. They regard themselves as its ideal care-takers. Only thus 
can a just distribution of resources be guaranteed such that every 
living creature gets its entitled share of goods.  
 
Gandhi’s Rights as Human Rights?  
Gandhi’s understanding of natural law seems to lead him to hold 
that this law bestows certain fundamental rights on human beings, 
as on all living creatures. Evidently, these rights are pre-political; 
at least ideally, they can be upheld by a moral community without 
a coercive state. But can these rights be related to human rights? 
To be more precise, can they be thought of as human rights? Going 
by our analysis, it would be difficult to plausibly deny that this is 
the case. The use of inalienable rights does seem to suggest that 
certain human rights are being implemented in this conception. 
Although these inalienable rights are not restricted to the human 
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fold, they are clearly not a product of human agency. In a certain 
sense they can be considered to be a precondition of this agency 
itself. As was worked out above, the right to life and livelihood, 
the right to obtain and enjoy vital resources, and the freedom to 
develop one’s personality are crucial in the satisfaction of human 
needs. All human beings are entitled to them and in addition, 
human collectivities seem to have an inalienable right to resistance 
of unjust political authority. But why is Gandhi hesitant in calling 
them so?  
Richard Sorabji offers a plausible explanation when he 
relates this hesitancy with Gandhi’s worry that “the formulation of 
rights does, and the performance of duties does not, lead to 
violence” (Sorabji 2012: 106). In other words: As entitlements, 
human rights can indeed be located in this conception. 
Nevertheless, this understanding seems to choose to foreground 
the moral appeal of human rights. In a just society, these 
entitlements induce the duty-bearer to act such that the justified 
entitlements of the right-bearer are secured. 
If this interpretation makes sense, standard renditions on 
this score must be rectified, which claim that Gandhi’s duty-based 
morality is continuous with the Hindu, or rather Indian, traditions 
of the subcontinent. These explain away Gandhi’s stress on duties 
by pointing to his attempt to interlink the India of his day with the 
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Hindu political thinking on rta and dharma; the latter of which is 
said to solely emphasize duties. According to Judith Brown (2000: 
97-98), for example, there was little place in Gandhi’s vision for 
“rights”. In addition, she asserts that he clearly was not engaged in 
the protection of human rights and believes that those who read 
him so, engage in the making of a “myth”.  
As sketched above, rights in Gandhi’s understanding are 
closely related to duties and result from the latter. However, 
Gandhian morality is not completely exhausted by a list of 
stipulated duties. Being moral in this view consists in upholding an 
intricate web of duties and rights. The view that Gandhi solely 
propagated a duty-based morality cannot, therefore, be wholly 
sustained. As Sorabji (2012: 107) rightly highlights, duties must be 
performed so that one’s own needs are met.  
Gandhi, as we see, works from (human) duties towards 
(human) rights. In an ideal world, human beings are equipped with 
moral resources which enable them to perform their duties towards 
each other—every person can obtain his or her just share of 
resources which are essential for his or her survival and moral 
flourishing. In our less-ideal world, however, coercive instances 
like the state could be required when human beings, momentarily, 
stray from the path of the moral good. Clearly, such instances are 
short interventions, which merely bridge the gap between 
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individual episodes of moral struggle. It would be ill-conceived, 
however, to postulate such instances as constant features of social 
and political reality.   
IV Conclusion 
Let me, in this final section, return to a more general plane and 
take up some of the thoughts mentioned in the introduction. Why 
are reconstructions, like the one attempted in these pages and 
similar endeavors, relevant at all?  
Gandhi’s understanding of natural law and rights is, to the 
best of my knowledge, curiously under-illuminated in academia. 
This understanding, however, could prove to be of crucial practical 
significance in the (further) development of Indian narratives on 
rights and human rights given that this conception operates with 
concepts such as rights of all living creatures, austerity, 
renunciation, modesty, humility, the multi-faceted nature of truth, 
etc. All these concepts come to operate, and are instantiated, in 
different ways in the traditions found in the Indian subcontinent. 
Beyond this practical aspect, another reason indicates the need for 
this and similar reconstructions.  
In order to understand what holds our normative 
vocabulary in place, we, as (political) philosophers, must draw on 
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similar examples, draw analogies and disanalogies, find 
precedents, exchange narratives, draw attention to intermediate 
cases, and we have to, in some cases, depart from the standard 
academic protocols ingrained in us during our formative academic 
years (cf. Tully 2008: 28). One upshot of this view would be that a 
more critical attitude towards the hidden assumptions of dominant 
models and their hegemonic universal applicability should be 
adopted. Models which were developed in a specific historic 
context cannot automatically be considered as the sole and 
ultimate standards of a good and viable theory, without sound 
reasons backing them up. A critical engagement with political 
practices found in different cultural contexts could pave the way 
for a richer and plural understanding of the political concepts used 
in academia. This view is steadily gaining currency in comparative 
philosophy. 
In the search for truly global values, for example, attention 
is paid to those conceptual resources located in different cultural 
traditions which could back up these values. This work, however, 
seems to presuppose a readiness to strike new paths and, perhaps, 
abandon well-tread trails.149 Amartya Sen warns about the perils 
of one such trail when he writes:  
                                                
149 Cf. Hall and Ames (2003: 16). 
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“Different cultures are […] interpreted in ways that 
reinforce the political conviction that Western 
civilization is somehow the main, perhaps the only, 
source of rationalistic and liberal ideas—among them 
analytical scrutiny, open debate, political tolerance and 
agreement to differ. The West is seen, in effect, as 
having exclusive access to the values that lie at the 
foundation of rationality and reasoning, science and 
evidence, liberty and tolerance, and of course rights 
and justice” (Sen 2005a: 285).  
Many comparative philosophers are optimistic that these new 
paths will prove to be rewarding for philosophy at large. The “sea 
change of great magnitude” to which Anglo-European philosophy 
is being currently subjected, will clear “the ground for mutual 
influence and enrichment” between different philosophical 
traditions (Tongqi, Rosemont and Ames 1995: 748). Human rights 
theorists, they believe, can augment this change by working out 
alternative ways of understanding (human) rights in non-Anglo 
European traditions and finding more plausible alternatives to the 
dominant individualistic way of explicating (claim) rights in the 
Anglo-European tradition.150 Given the specific focus of this 
                                                
150 See for example, Bilimoria (1993) and Rosemont (1991: 57-78, 2004). 
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paper, this relatively new way of thinking in philosophy cannot be 
explicated in detail here. It does, however, open up the space to 
understand Gandhi’s interpretation of natural law and rights in its 
own light. And if my account is in any way convincing, it would 
be a small contribution to the larger goal envisaged by some 
comparative philosophers:  
“If we are seeking new perspectives in and on 
philosophy, if the discipline is to become as truly all-
encompassing in the future as it has mistakenly been 
assumed in the past, we must begin to develop a more 
common philosophical language to take its place 
alongside the other languages of the world” (Rosemont 
1988: 69).  
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